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LEGAL ASSISTANCE 
Petitioner had attempted to get legal representation from Utah Legal Service for 
preparation of this brief. My source of income, possessions, savings, etc. were within the 
financial guidelines of Utah Legal Services and would allow them to represent me free 
gratis. But after looking at my IRA's they said I was ineligible. (0104-0105) When I 
asked what it would cost to hire a lawyer, Mr. Dave Challed said, "Around $800 for the 
brief and representation." To me, $800 is like $8,000 and the return on investment to 
receiving unemployment benefits would not be reasonable. So I will try my best to 
understand the legal guidelines to preparing my brief for the Court of Appeals and do 
this, myself, without personal legal assistance. 
EXPLANATION OF PREVIOUS NUMBERING SYSTEM 
My original Docketing Statement included all the important dates and documents 
available up to then. The Department of Employment Security Petition for Review also 
listed these same documents and numbered them from 0001 to 0100. Thus for simplicity, 
and avoidance of repetition, I'll also refer thoughout my own brief to these same 
numbers, 0001-0100 found in this other document. In addition, the new document 
information introduced within my brief, starts on Pages 0101-0123, these numbers are 
correlated within the a i l A W ^ ^ " of my brief. 
1 
PETITIONER COUNTER POINTS 
TO ANSWER AND CERTIFICATION OF RECORD, 
As I considered the respondents five points in the "Answer and Certification of Record", 
document by Department of Employment Security, I have tried to address, list, and 
separate them with a number system throughout my brief. As the "Answer and 
Certification of Record" is found in my rcdJ^uAa^H^ as numbers (0112 and 0113), 
anytime the reader sees these numbers in the text can realize that I am drawing counter 
point examples for examination. Note: Item #3 will not be rebutted. The $931. 
overpayment is not an issue with me, it is fair if the Court of Appeals sides with the 
Department of Employment Security. 
STATEMENT SHOWING JURISDICTION 
This is an appeal of a final judgement from the Board of Review, the Industrial 
Commission of Utah, Unemployment Compensation Appeal, Case No. 92-A-7286, 
Decision, Case No. 92-BR-486. This appeal is concerning the Department of 
Employment Security deniel of my receiving Unemployment benefits. 
2 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL 
1. BOARD OF REVIEW'S SPECIAL IMPLIED GRANT OF DISCRETION 
Being a common individual using the courts, I am unaware of previous court cases that 
tend to disallow the judgement of a lower case in favor of a higher case. The Board of 
Review said "nor has it considered the new evidence provided by the employer on appeal 
in making this decision to reverse the Administrative Judge's determination." (0073, 
0112-#l,0113-#2,#4,#5) When the higher court has only the same evidence that the 
lower court had, that being nothing new, how can it come up with an exact opposite 
conclusion? I feel that this is what had happened with the capricious decision making of 
the Board of Review. How can the Board of Review be entitled to a deference pursuant 
to a grant of discretion in this matter? I don't understand this lack of predictable 
pattern of law. Due to fairness to those participating in the previous trial, higher courts 
shouldn't take liberty to overshadow the competent judgement of the Administrative Law 
Judge or of one of it's own Board of Review members when there isn't new evidence 
with which to judge from. (0073, 0112-#l,0113-#4,#5) 
The Administrative Law Judge quoted in her decision that "In this case, the claimant quit 
work...the claimant is not disqualified from the receipt of benefits"(0051) and within the 
ranks of the Board of Review there appeared an abstaining vote. The third Board of 
Review member affirms the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, Hon. Reanna K. 
Sloniger: 
3 
ffIn my opinion, the claimant met his burden to prove that his work situation with the 
employer was untenable and "sufficiently adverse to a reasonable person1 to outweigh 
the benefits of remaining employed." His supervisor's constant eruptive irritation with 
the claimant, coupled with the claimant's diabetes and his fruitless efforts to persuade 
the company president to control Wen Winegar's angry outbursts constituted good 
cause2 for quitting. I would, therefore, affirm the decision of the Administrative Law 
Judge. 
/ S / Connie Neilson (0075) 
I wish to know why the conclusions appeared to vacillate so widely between judiciary 
constituents; Judge Sloniger and Connie Neilson for employment benefits, Mr. Carlson 
and Mr. Hanover against. I wonder if the background viewpoints of the Board of 
Review members had any bearing in their attitudes in this case. Which factions of the 
community do each represent? Were some more pro management (employer) and 
another more pro labor (employee), thus affecting their decision making? (0112-#1) 
2. SOCIAL COSTS STATUTE3 
As I sought a solution as if it was possible to defuse placing fault on the employer or the 
1
 R562-5A-2. Good Cause, 1 a. Adverse effect on the 
claimant. 
2
 R562-5A-5 Evidence and Burden of Proof. " he had "good 
cause" for quitting..." 
3
 35-4-7.4 Social Costs—Relief or Charges. 1 (g) "Any 
benefit costs..." 
4 
employee, I called Mr. Devine of Job Service and poised that question. He mentioned 
the issue of "Social Costs". Upon further inquiry, Emma Thomas, Attorney for 
Respondent gave to me the 35-4-7.4 "Social Cost - Relief of Charges" statute. As in 
section 1(g), could Utah Pump/Mike Mortensen fit this case definition? "Any benefit 
costs that are not charged to an employer and are not defined in this subsection are also 
social costs." (0102-0103) Due to the existent former employer/employee friendships, 
(0003, 0015) issues of quit VS compelled pressure to quit (the reasons why), issues of 
family business VS rights of the individual employee...how did two of the three Board of 
Review members be so absolutely decisive when it "concludes that it would not be 
against equity and good conscience to deny unemployment insurance benefits in this 
matter".(0074) Does this case have to unreasonably be stamped right/wrong, 
accepted/denied like Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover averred, and due to their split vote 
with Connie Neilson, arbitrarily sway the balance? (0112-#l,0113-#2,#5) Could the 
Social Costs statute4 apply here? 
3. AGAINST EQUITY AND GOOD CONSCIENCE, FACTS OF LAW 
In reversing the Administrative Law Judge, Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover said: 
"In reversing the decision of the Administrative Law Judge, the Board of Review notes 
that in quit cases it is the claimant who has the burden to prove that he or she had good 
4
 35-4-7-4 Social Costs—Relief or charges• 1 (g) "Any 
benefit costs..." 
5 
cause to quit5 or that it would be against equity and good conscience to deny 
unemployment insurance benefits. The Board of Review finds that the claimant in this 
case quit precipitously when Mr. Winegar lost his temper with the claimant because of 
the way he took a telephone message. While Mr. Winegar's repeated bursts of irritation 
with the claimant are not condoned by the Board of Review, the Board notes that in 
order to establish good cause for quitting a claimant must establish that: 
"The separation [was] motivated by circumstances which made continuance of the 
employment a hardship or matter of real concern sufficiently adverse for a reasonable 
person6 to outweigh the benefits of remaining employed. There must be a showing of 
actual or potential, physical, mental, economic, personal or professional harm caused or 
aggravated by continuance in the employment. The claimants reasons for belief of the 
consequences of remaining on the job must be real, not imaginary; substantial, not 
trifling. The circumstances must be applied to the average individual, not the 
supersensitive. [Utah Administrative Code R562-5a-2 (1992).] (0073) 
"Though the claimant described to the Administrative Law Judge a work situation that 
was unpleasant to him and also described some physical and emotional difficulties due 
to his diabetes, he had worked with these job conditions for some time. The Board of 
Review finds that immediate severance of the employment situation was, therefore, not 
required by the claimant. The Board of Review concludes that circumstances on the 
job, while admittedly not ideal, simply were not so compelling that the claimant had to 
5
 R562-5A-5 Evidence and Burden of Proof• "...he had "good 
cause" for quitting..." 
6
 R562-5a-2. Good Cause, 1 a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant. 
6 
quit without first obtaining alternate employment." 
"Furthermore, since the Board of Review finds that the claimant's act of quitting 
precipitously without first obtaining alternative employment was unreasonable, it 
concludes that it would not be against equity and good conscience7 to deny 
unemployment insurance benefits in this matter."(0073-0074) 
4. STRESSFUL WORKING CONDITIONS 
I wish to address these Board of Review findings and to exemplify my points of view 
through former testimony and documents. On July 16, 1992 in the "Claimant Statement 
of Voluntary Quit", I stated, "Our personalities have, at times, clashed with each other 
and have caused each of us anxiety and resulted in yelling at each other...we were both 
at the end of our rope and could see that it was not a happy situation, seeing how his 
needs and the reality of my ability range to work like this were incompatible." (0003, 
0113-#2) I wrote an appeal letter to the Department of Employment Security, received 
on Aug. 21, 1992 in which I said, "...There had been several argument yelling matches 
over the months that decimated myself to the point where I did make much effort to 
seek other employment...All during this time I was working for Mr. Winegar, doing what 
he asked, giving great attention to helping him in all the areas that he needed from me, 
as an office manager. I had to put up with rudeness, being blamed for not doing things 
that were never assigned to me (ambiguity on the Bosses part), told I was forgetful, yet 
7
 R562-5a-2 Good Cause. 1 a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant 
7 
upon bringing facts to light, I was yelled at and blamed. I, upon drawing attention to my 
feelings and observations of my treatment delivered from certain related [relative] 
employees, I was told to back off. I can quote instances in which I had to "back off1 
with hurt feelings, biting my tongue to prevent further harsh words, or have full blown 
yelling matches. I have worked in a taunting atmosphere where my self respect was 
never considered and reduced to where I had to lash back with a loud "I quit"... (0113-
#2) 
"I have listened and been hurt when I heard my employer tell another employee, my 
equal, of things that he was critical. The incident was held in me for a long time, later 
to be said, in which I was apologized to. (0113-#2) 
"Working in a family business had some bad advantages...Many things are implied and 
gets blamed of on the office manager if they are not done..." (0012-0014, 0113-#2) 
5. PRESSURE VS ASK FOR JOB BACK 
And of the animosity that contributed to me saying "I quit", Judge Sloniger asked and I 
answered her question: 
Judge: Alright, did you decide, I mean did you in that week plus the couple of days you 
had, did you think maybe you should not have quit and asked for your job back? 
Claimant: I actually did state something to that affect. 
Judge: To Whom. 
Claimant: To Wen 
8 
Judge: Wen? After that? 
Claimant: Something in that period it was stated something to that affect you know that 
well I've got to get my words real careful here because I really, I had come close to the 
end of my rope as he was willing to let me quit. I didn't know whether I wanted to 
continue under the pressure (0113-#2) because it seemed to be quite unbearable to me. 
The pressure meaning the animosity that I felt expressed towards me." (0036. 0113-#2) 
6. EG&G - ACCOUNTS PAYABLE INCIDENT 
Another incident referred to Judge Sloniger showed tension within the office and 
resulted in me quitting earlier: 
Claimant: I had a bill that had been in my accounts payable for months, and I went back 
to see from former checks whether we had paid it, and the check indicated a check had 
gone out maybe nine months previous to that time for EG&G [note: I'm not sure it was 
EG&G, it might have been Ingersol/Rand, or Sealol]. Now they were not pressing us to 
pay it. However, the bills did appear, and I went back to talk to Wen about it [I pursued 
it not to hassle Wen] and he got really angry that we had not paid it. [At times we 
didn't have money to pay all our creditors anyway. Sometimes, some of us, myself 
included, helped out by loaning Wen money when it was really needed. A 
"supersensitive individual," might be less bending and less willing to make loans if he 
didn't already care about his employer and feel he should sometimes "roll up his sleeves" 
and help. (0073) I still have $700 out from that time, as well as an issue of a week of 
vacation pay coming from Utah Pump. (0037, 0063, 0108)] I've got to interject that I, 
9 
with my accounts payable systems monthly would give the accounts payable to Wen to 
show what was owed and how many days, months, it was overdue and so he knows of the 
businesses that needed to be paid. 
Judge: In other words what you are saying is that he already knew about this because 
you gave him monthly statements. 
Claimant: All the time 
Judge: Alright. 
Claimant: I was giving him monthly statements. 
Judge: So he got angry. 
Claimant: Well he got angry thinking that we had paid that and why didn't you know 
that. He got really ticked. (0113-#2) I got really ticked because I was bringing it to his 
attention to help me with information of what he knew, and at that time I got angry. I 
wanted to tell Mitch about it, and all the time, Mitch is so busy you try to take care of 
things as best you can with his dad. I brought it to his attention, showed him, even made 
a phone call, found out yes indeed this amount was still owed, and he later, like I said, I 
found his kindness with how he apologized so I rescinded and decided not to quit. (0113-
#2) 
Judge: Okay. 
Claimant: Is this the time where I can tell you of incidents your Honor? 
Judge: You can, but I don't need them. 
Claimant: I'm trying to... 
Judge: Did you quit, did you quit as the Department found to look for other work or 
10 
did you quit because you couldn't stand working with Wen and he created anxiety and 
stress. (0113-#2) Why did you quit? 
Claimant: I guess I need to, see the answer to that question... 
Judge: No listen to me, listen to me, when you said-
Claimant: It became so stressful that I left. 
Judge: Yes and you said that. Here's what you said. 
Claimant: I left because of that. 
Judge: You said, "The anxiety and the pressure built up working with Wen, and I said, 'I 
quit'" And you gave second thoughts but because of all of the incidents with Wen you 
decided not to ask for your job back. That's what you've told me as the reason you quit. 
Is that the reason you quit? 
Claimant: That's the reason. The anxiety was overwhelming..." (0041-0042,0113-#2) 
7. ANY REASONABLE PERSON 
I feel that from the first series of documents filled out, the "Claimant Statement of 
Voluntary Quit" (0002-0005, 0113-#2) on up to the trial where Judge Sloniger asked me 
in detail and under oath, I have told of the anxiety that Mr. Winegar and I both worked 
under. Why wasn't this clear enough for Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover? I had 
established the fact that I had shown burden of proof that I had good cause to quit.8 
Paraphrasing Connie Neilson, I also believe that any reasonable person9 would have 
8
 R562-5A-5 Evidence and Burden of Proof. "...he had "good 
cause" for quitting..." 
9
 R562-5a-2 Good Cause. 1 a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant 
11 
done the same as I had after outweighing the same benefits of remaining employed. 
(0075, 0113-#2) I felt there was a showing of mental and professional harm caused by 
continuance in the employment, and that I didn't imagine this happening nor was it 
trifling. I claim I am not supersensitive, but am an average individual. (0073) 
8. INELIGIBILITY (OR ELIGIBILITY) FOR BENEFITS, QUIT STATUTE 35-4-5 
I wonder if Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover would have worked under the conditions that I 
tarried under when they said, "Though the claimant described...a work situation that was 
unpleasant to him...he had worked with these job conditions for some time." (0074, 0112-
#1, 0113-#2,#5) Unpleasant isn't the word, it was more like unbearable. Did they 
think I should have quit before allowing such stressful conditions to happen? Why did 
they imply that I had gotten used to this? Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover stated "he had 
working under these conditions for some time. The Board of Review finds that 
immediate severance of the employment situation was, therefore, not required by the 
claimant. The Board of Review concludes that circumstances on the job, while 
admittedly not ideal, [arbitrarily stated, 0112-#l,0113-#2,#5) simply were not so 
compelling that the claimant had to quit without first obtaining alternative employment." 
Would Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover have stayed under similar conditions? (0113-#2) 
Did they think I gave up my rights by severancing my relationship with Utah Pump? If 
so, it's not fair and their judgement should be overturned. The same law that protects 
employers protects employees working under duress also. If duress is such that it 
becomes unbearable that such employee has to quit his job, then, after a determination, 
12 
he would still receive benefits. In statute 35-4-5, "Ineligibility for Benefits. Quit" it states 
"A Claimant shall not be denied eligibility for benefits if the claimant leaves work under 
conditions of such nature that it would be contrary to equity and good conscience to 
impose a disqualification."10 (0119) Though I had decided to stay under duress, or as 
Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover averred "he had worked under these conditions for some 
time" (0074) did not mean I forfeited my unemployment benefit rights when I did quit 
and asked for them. I have presented evidence to show that the work environment was 
unbearable, not just unpleasant. (0112-#1, 0113-#2,#5) 
9. REFUSAL TO RECOGNIZE EFFORT 
The statute 35-4-5, "Eligibility for Benefits, Quit" says, "The commission shall, in 
cooperation with the employer, consider...the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing attachment to the 
labor market in reaching a determination of whether the ineligibility is contrary to equity 
and good conscience."11 (0119) I believe as Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover considered 
"the reasonableness of the claimants actions", they capriciously concluded that though I 
hadn't first obtained alternative employment before quitting, they didn't recognize that I 
was trying. (0003, 0005, 0112-#1, 0113-#5) How many judicial seats are there when a 
difficulty arises, so that a judge has a job to go to enabling such judge to leave the other 
behind? To assume by Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover that I was not looking for another 
10
 35-4-5 Ineligibility for Benefits. Quit, (a) "A claimant shall not be denied..." 
11
 35-4-5 Ineligibility for Benefits. Quit, (a)"... genuine continuing attachment..." 
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job while at Utah Pump was not correct, of not having another job to go to is correct. 
My situation in finding a job, could be considered similar to finding a judgeship - not 
many of them - and is just as real for me on my own level as a recreational therapist. I 
had limited options available as a recreational therapist as I said to Judge Sloniger: 
Claimant: ...The anxiety was overwhelming. I didn't have another job to go to. I 
brought newspaper articles, not articles, but help wanted ads that shows a variety of days 
showing that there's not a whole lot of recreation therapy jobs... (0113-#2,#5) 
Judge: Why are you focusing on recreation therapy jobs? 
Claimant: Because I'm licensed in that..." (0042) 
Besides these statements made to Judge Sloniger, why wasn't my initial "Claimant 
Statement of Voluntary Quit", dated July 16, 1992 enough to show that I was trying to 
replace my current employment with that of the National Cart Company? (0112-#1,0113-
#2,#5) "From January on, I had been trying to get another job of washing and repairing 
shopping carts from a former friend of mine, LeRoy Sampson. That person was trying to 
renew his contract contacts with companies in the intermountain West...I had been 
letting Mr. Winegar know of this effort and of my subsequent future quitting which Mr. 
Winegar was patiently letting me work for him until I started the new job..." (0003 & 
0005) Mr. Carlson and Mr. Hanover "against equity and good conscience" (0073) refused 
to acknowledge this effort. (0112-#1, 0113-#2,#4,#5). 
I wish to quote from the Docketing Statement to further elaborate my claim that I was 
making efforts to prepare myself for future work while at Utah Pump, "I wish however, it 
be known that the Winegars have tried to help me with my employment needs. First and 
14 
foremost, they gave me a job...I started working for Utah Pump in a new position to me, 
Office Manager. It was also within this same letter that I also said I had received a 
power stream sprayer from Wen in exchange for a debt I had with him. I needed a 
sprayer pump, they gave me a good deal on one that hadn't sold for months. I had a 
trailer in which Wen offered to trade a wire feed welder so that his son could use the 
trailer to start another business. They were willing to give me time, information and 
their help to prepare for the instance I would start working intra-state for National Cart 
Company. I was disappointed that the job never materialized, the job that both Wen 
and I thought would be excellent and would allow me to stop working for them. I was 
looking for other work and Utah Pump was helping me." (0095-0096, 0112-#l,0113-#5) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
1. When the higher court has only the same evidence that the lower court had, 
nothing new, why was the conclusion exactly the opposite? How can the Board of 
Review be entitled to a deference pursuant to a grant in this matter? In what 
statue is this expressly made or implied within? Why did the conclusions appear 
to vacillate so widely between judiciary constituents? Does not the two of three 
split in the voting members of the Board of Review impugn the idea of its 
conclusion being done in equity and good conscience? 
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2. Did the background of any member of the Board of Review individually 
contribute to its decision making? 
3. Could the "Social Costs" statute12, section 1(g), "and are not defined in this 
subsection are also Social Costs" be referred to in this case? Because the benefit 
costs were not to be charged to the employer according to two of the Board of 
Review members, why must they be charged to the employee? Was it possible for 
the Board of Review, by using this subsection, to defuse placing fault on the 
employer or the employee thus maintaining its equity and good conscience in its 
conclusions? 
4. "While the circumstances on the job were admittedly", stated by the Board of 
Review, "not ideal" and the "employers repeated bursts of irritation were", also, 
"not condoned" (0073), how could its deciding members say that its decision 
making was done in equity and good conscience?13 Doesn't these admissions 
show that there was a contributory cause of unnecessary stress to the atmosphere 
of this work environment? 
5. If such animosity was in existence to the Board of Review, why didn't it assume a 
more prevalent part in their decision making? Was not this the claimant "burden 
12
 35-4-7.4 Social Costs-Relief or charges. 
13
 R562-5a-5 Good Cause. 1 a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant 
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to prove"?(0073) Why wasn't this viewed as "so compelling that the claimant had 
to quit without first obtaining alternate employment"?(0074) I have presented 
evidence to show that the work environment was unbearable, not just unpleasant. 
Did they think I should have quit before allowing such stressful conditions to 
happen? Why did they imply that I had gotten used to this? Because I had 
worked under these conditions for some time, didn't forfeit my unemployment 
benefit rights when I quit and asked for them. Was I expected to work under 
these conditions without alternate unemployment rights by the Board of Review? 
Would any reasonable person14 have done the same as I have done after 
outweighing the same benefits of remaining employed? 
6. Why did the deciding Board of Review members refuse to acknowledge my efforts 
to find employment through efforts with recreation therapy jobs (0042) or the 
effort of buying, trading and collecting of equipment for the National Cart 
Company?(0003, 0086) As the deciding Board of Review members considered 
"the reasonableness of the claimants actions", they capriciously concluded that 
though I hadn't first obtained alternative employment before quitting, they hadn't 
acknowledged that I was trying. 
14
 R562-5A-2 Good Cause. 1 a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant 
17 
CONCLUSION 
So in summary, I feel that a higher court (Board of Review), using only the same 
information available to the lower court (Administrative Law Judge), should not be 
allowed such discretionary liberties in this case. If such "implied" statue language does 
exist as stated by Emma R. Thomas, Attorney for Department Security (0113-#4), it is 
not known to me or to the general public. I just reason that common sense would not 
allow such a conclusionary reversal as such would appear quite unreasonable, irrational, 
arbitrary and capricious. (0112-#l,0113-#5) How does any employee have rights and is 
supported upon a quit if not in this case? (0113-#2) Or does the employer's rights take 
priority over the employee's rights? (0112-#2,#4) How much did the Board of Review 
want me to take before they would say "enough"? (0112-#1) Why did not the Board of 
Review recognize my actions to try to remain attached to the labor market? Was this 
not "against equity and good conscience" to deny unemployment benefits"? (0073) 
Dated this ^ Z ^ a y of May, 1993 
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hearby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of the Brief by depositing the 
same in the United States mail, postage prepaid to the following: 
Utah Pump and Motor Supply 
c/o Mitch Winegar 
1839 South 900 West 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84104 
Emma R. Thomas #4681 
Attorney for Respondant 
Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah, Department of 
Employment Security 
40 East 300 South 
P. O. Box 11600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
Dated this ^ £ day of May, 1993 
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In copying the Docketing Statement, the cost was over $40. I have 
included these receipts as an explanation of why in my brief I refer 
to 0001 to 0100 of the Department of Employment Securities Petition 
for Review of previously introduced documentation. I hope to cut costs 
and repitition by doing this. 
35-4-7.4 
3 5 - 4 - 7 . 4 Soc ia l c o s t s — Relief or charges . 
(1) Social costs shall consist of those benefit costs defined as follows: 
(a) Benefit costs of an individual will not be charged to a base-period 
employer, but will be considered social costs if the individual's separation 
from that employer occurred under any of the following circumstances: 
(i) the individual was discharged by the employer or voluntarily quit 
employment with the employer for disqualifying reasons, but subsequently 
requalified for benefits and actually received benefits; 
(ii) the individual received benefits following a quit which was not 
attributable to the employer; or 
(iii) the individual received benefits following a discharge for non-
performance due to medical reasons. 
(b) Social costs are benefit costs which are or have been charged to 
employers who have terminated coverage and are no longer liable for 
contributions, less the amount of contributions paid by such employers 
during the same time period. 
(c) The difference between the benefit charges of all employers 
whose benefit ratio e x c e e d s the maximum overall contribution 
rate and the amount determined by multiplying the taxable payroll of the 
same employers by the maximum overall contribution rate is a social cost. 
(d) Benefit costs attributable to a concurrent base-period employer 
will not be charged to that employer if the individual's customary hours of 
work for that employer have not been reduced. 
(e) Benefit costs incurred during the course of commiss ion-
approved training which occurs after December 31, 1985, will not be 
charged to base-period employers. 
(0 Benefit costs will not be charged to employers if such costs are 
attributable to: 
(i) the state's share of extended benefits; 
(ii) uncollectible benefit overpayment; 
(iii) the proportion of benefit costs of combined wage claims that 
are chargeable to Utah employers and are insufficient when separately 
considered for a monetary eligible claim under Utah law and which have 
been transferred to a paying state; and 
26 
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35-4.7-4 
(iv) benefit costs attributable to wages used in a previous benefit 
year that are available for a second benefit year under Subsection 35-4-3 (b) 
because of a change in method of computing base-periods, overlapping 
base-periods, or for other reasons required by law. 
(g) Any benefit costs that are not charged to an r uployer and 
not defined in this subsection are also social costs. 
Exclusion of Reimbursable Employers. 
(2) Subsection (1) applies only to contributing employers and not to 
employers which have elected to finance the payment of benefits in 
accordance with Section 344-7.5 or 35-4-8.5. 
35-4-7.45 Bonds to Ensure Compliance. 
(1) The commission, whenever it considers it necessary to ensure 
compliance with this chapter, may require any employer, subject to the 
contribution imposed hereunder, to deposit with it any bond or security as 
the commission shall determine. The bond or security may be sold by the 
commission at public sale, if it becomes necessary, in order to recover any 
tax, interest, or penalty due. Notice of the sale may be served upon the 
employer who deposited the securities personally or by mail. If by mail, 
notice sent to the last-known address as the same appears in the records of 
the commission is sufficient for purposes of this requirement. Upon the sale, 
the surplus, if any, above the amounts due, shall be returned to the 
employer who deposited the security. 
(2)(a) If an employer fails to comply with Subsection (1), the district 
court of the county in which the employer resides or in which he employs 
workers shall, upon the commencement of a suit by the commission for that 
purpose, enjoin the employer from further employing workers in this state 
or continuing in business until the employer has complied with Subsection 
(1). 
(b) Upon filing of a suit for such purpose by the commission, the court 
shall set a date for hearing and cause notice to be served upon the employer. 
The hearing shall be not less than five nor more than 15 days from the 
service of the notice. 
35-4-7.5 Nonprofit Organizations. 
Financing of Benefits. 
(a) Notwithstanding any other provisions of this chapter for payments 
by employers, benefits paid to employees of nonprofit organizations, 
27 
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UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC. 
124 SOUTH 400 EAST • 4TH FLOOR 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
(801) 328-8891 
WATS 1-800-662-4245 
A p r i l 20 , 1993 
Michael J. Mortensen 
8001 South 1300 West 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Dear Mr. Mortensen: 
I have reviewed your request for assistance from Utah Legal 
Services with Dave Challed, and I agree with his determination that 
your IRA account is an asset which must be considered to determine 
whether you are financially eligible for services. I understand 
that you would face a penalty for withdrawing funds from your IRA 
account, but despite the penalty it is an asset which is available 
to you which we cannot overlook. 
Attached are the regulations which charge our Board with 
setting asset ceilings (§1611.6) and a copy of the asset guidelines 
they have adopted. Also attached is the grievance procedure, your 
next step would be to appeal this determination to Brian Barnard 
because Waine Riches and I have reviewed the matter and agree with 
Dave's analysis. We wish you good luck pursuing your claim for 
unemployment benefits. 
Sincerely, 
Anne Milne 
Director 
enclosures 
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maximum income level on the basis of 
factors listed in § 1611.5(b)(1), the fac-
tors listed in § 1611.5(b)(2) shall also 
be used before reaching a final deter-
mination. 
(B) If a recipient tentatively deter-
mines not to serve a client under the 
maximum income level on the basis of 
factors listed in § 1611.5(b)(2), the fac-
tors listed in § 1611.5(b)(1) must also 
be used before reaching a final deter-
mination. 
(c) A recipient may provide legal as-
sistance to a group, corporation, or as-
sociation if it is primarily composed of 
persons eligible for legal assistance 
under the Act and if it provides infor-
mation showing that it lacks, and has 
no practical means of obtaining, funds 
to retain private counsel. 
§ 1611.6 Asset ceilings. 
(a) By January 30, 1984, and annual-
ly thereafter, the governing body of 
the recipient shall establish and trans-
mit to the Corporation guidelines in-
corporating specific and reasonable 
asset ceilings, including both liquid 
andjipn-liquid asse^To be utilized in" 
"BHermining eligfbmTy for services? 
The guideTffres shall* consider me econ-
omy of the service area and the rela-
tive cost-of-living of low-income per-
sons so as to ensure the availability of 
services to those in the greatest eco-
nomic and legal need. 
(b) The guidelines shall be consist-
ent with the recipient's priorities es-
tablished in accordance with 45 CFR 
1620 and special consideration shall be 
given to the legal needs of the elderly, 
institutionalized, and handicapped. 
(c) Assets considered shall include 
all liquid and non-liquid assets of all 
persons who are resld^nrniembers of a 
family unit, except that a recipient 
may exclude the principal residence of 
a client. The guideline* sha.11 ta.kp intn 
account impediments to an individ-
ual's access to £gg£ts oi the family_unit 
or nousenoiq. 
(d) Reasonable equity value in work-
related equipment which is essential 
to the employment or self-employ-
ment of an applicant or member of a 
family unit, shall not be utilized to dis-
qualify an applicant, provided that the 
owner is attempting to produce income 
consistent with its fair market value. 
(e) Thg governing body may estab-
lish authority for the project director 
to waive tne ceilings on mlnimu^gT-
lowable assets in unusual or extremely 
meritoriouF situations, in the event 
that a waiver is granted, that decision 
shall be documented and incluc d in 
the client's file. The recipient ,hail 
keep such other records as will p vide 
information to the Corporatior is to 
the number of clients so serv and 
the factual basis for the de .sions 
made. 
§ 1611.7 Manner of determining eligibility. 
(a) A recipient shall adopt a simple 
form and procedure to obtain informa-
tion to determine eligibility in a 
manner that promotes the develop-
ment of trust between attorney and 
client. The form and procedure adopt-
ed shall be subject to approval by the 
Corporation, and the information ob-
tained shall be preserved, in a manner 
that protects the identity of the client, 
for audit by the Corporation. 
(b) If there is substantial reason to 
doubt the accuracy of the information, 
a recipient shall make appropriate in-
quiry to verify it, in a manner consist-
ent with an attorney-client relation-
ship. 
(c) Information furnished to a recip-
ient by a client to establish financial 
eligibility shall not be disclosed to any 
person who is not employed by the re-
cipient in a manner that permits iden-
tification of the client, without ex-
press written consent of the client, 
except that the recipient shall provide 
such information to the Corporation 
when: 
(1) The Corporation is investigating 
allegations that question the financial 
eligibility of a previously identified 
client and the recipient's representa-
tion thereof; 
(2) The information sought by the 
Corporation relates solely to the fi-
nancial eligibility of that particular 
client; 
(3) The information sought by the 
Corporation is necessary to confirm or 
deny specific allegations relating to 
that particular client's financial eligi-
bility and the recipient's representa-
tion thereof; and 
0105 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL J. MDRTENSEN 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Respondent. 
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * 
Record of Petition for Review to the Utah Court of Appeals 
from the Industrial Caranission of Utah 
Department of Employment Security 
Appearances: 
Michael J. Mortensen 
Petitioner, Pro se 
8001 South 1300 West 
West Jorxian, Utah 84088 
Emma R. Thomas #4681 
Attorney for Respondent 
Industrial Commission of Utah 
Departanent of Employment Security 
140 East 300 South 
P. O. Box 11600 
Salt lake City, Utah 84147 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL J. MORTENSEN, 
Petitioner, 
v. 
DEPARIMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, 
Respondent. 
CEKTIFICATE 
Case No. 930093-CA 
I hereby certify that I am the duly appointed, qualified Secretary to 
the Board of Review of the Industrial Commission of Utah; that as such 
Secretary, I hereby certify that the following documents, numbered 
0001 to 0100 inclusive, and designated as: 
Page(s) 
Claim for Unemployment Benefits, Form 601, dated 
July 17, 1992, effective July 12, 1992, for the 
claimant, Mike Mortensen (Exhibit 6) 0001 
Claimant Statement of Voluntary Quit, Form 680-Q1, 
dated July 16, 1992, for the claimant, Mike 
Mortensen (Exhibit 4) 0002-0005 
Eligibility Certification, Form 653-C, dated 
July 17, 1992 (Exhibit 5) 0006-0007 
Record of Weekly Job Search Efforts (Exhibit 8) 0008 
Employer Notice of Claim Filed, Form 606, dated 
July 28, 1992, unsigned, received by the Depart-
ment on July 29, 1992 (Exhibit 3) 0009 
Decision of Eligibility For Unemployment Insurance 
Benefits, Form 615-J, dated August 12, 1992 
(Exhibit 2) 0010 
0108 
Page(s) 
Appeal From Decision of Representative, Form 617, 
received August 21, 1992, frcm the claimant, Mike 
Mortensen (Exhibit 1) 0011-0014 
Letter dated September 9, 1992, frcm Utah Punp and 
Motor Supply Company, received September 23, 1992, 
with attached letters of employees (Exhibits 7-A, 
7-B, 7-C and 7-D) 0015-0019 
Notice of Hearing, Form 743, dated September 16, 
1992, advising the claimant, Mike Mortensen, and 
the employer, Utah Punp & Motor Supply Co., of a 
hearing scheduled for Thursday, September 24, 1992 
at 9:00 AM (Exhibit C) 0020 
Response Card, Form 725, frcm the claimant, Mike 
Mortensen, indicating the claimant will attend the 
hearing as scheduled (Exhibit D) 0021 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge mailed Sep-
tember 24, 1992 (Exhibit B) 0022-0023 
Appeal From Decision of Representative, Form 617, 
frcm the claimant, Mite Mortensen, dated Septem-
ber 24, 1992, received September 24, 1992 
(Exhibit A) 0024 
Notice of Hearing, Form 743, dated October 5, 
1992, advising the claimant, Mike Mortensen, and 
the employer, Utah Punp & Motor Supply Co., of a 
hearing scheduled for Friday, October 16, 1992 at 
8:30 AM 0025 
Transcript of Hearing held October 16, 1992 0026-0047 
Decision of Administrative Law Judge mailed Novem-
ber 13, 1992 0048-0053 
Letter of Appeal to the Board of Review, addressed 
to the Administrative Law Judge from the employer, 
Utah Punp & Motor Supply Co., dated November 18, 
1992, received November 20, 1992 0054-0055 
0109 
Letter dated November 27, 1992 from the Board of 
Review to the employer, Utah Pump & Motor Supply 
Company, acknowledging receipt of its appeal to 
the Board of Review, with a copy to the claimant, 
Mike Mortensen, allowing both parties 15 days in 
which to submit written arguments or comments 0056 
Letter inemorandum dated December 2, 1992, from the 
employer, Utah Pump & Motor Supply Co., to the 
Board of Review, in support of the employer's 
appeal to the Board of Review 0057-0058 
Letter memorandum dated December 11, 1992, from 
the claimant, Mike Mortensen, to the Board of 
Review in rebuttal to the employer's appeal to the 
Board of Review, with attachments 0059-0069 
1. Letter dated December 11, 1992 0059-0067 
2. Letter dated July 15, 1992 from Quality Care 
Murray concerning Mike Mortensen 0068 
3. Letter dated October 14, 1992 from Dr. John 
Houchins, Redwood Community Health, corK^ erning 
Mike Mortensen 0069 
Letter dated December 28, 1992, from the Board of 
Review to Utah Pump & Motor Supply Company, with a 
copy to the claimant, Mike Mortensen, forwarding a 
copy of the claimant's memorandum dated Decem-
ber 11, 1992, to the employer; forwarding a copy 
of the employer's memorandum dated December 2, 
1992 to the claimant 0070 
Claimant Record Transcript dated December 31, 1992 0071 
Decision of the Board of Review dated January 13, 
1993 0072-0076 
Letter dated January 13, 1993 from the Board of 
Review to the claimant, Mike Mortensen, submitting 
the decision of the Board of Review 0077 
Page(s) 
Letter dated January 13, 1993 from the Board of 
Review to Utah Pump & Motor Supply Company submit-
ting the decision of the Board of Review 0078 
Petition for Writ of Review filed with the Utah 
Court of Appeals on February 12, 1993 by the 
claimant, Michael J. Mortensen, received by the 
Board of Review on February 17, 1993, with 
attached letter of appeal dated February 12, 1993 0079-0086 
1. Petition for Writ of Review 0079 
2. Letter of appeal dated February 12, 1993 0080-0086 
Writ of Review filed on February 12, 1993 by the 
Utah Court of Appeals, received by the Board of 
Review on February 17, 1993 0087 
Docketing Statement filed by Michael J. Mortensen 
on March 5, 1993, to the Utah Court of Appeals, 
received by the Board of Review on March 6, 1993 0088-0099 
Letter dated March 9, 1993 to the employer, Utah 
Pump & Motor Supply Company, advising the employer 
that the claimant, Michael J. Mortensen, has filed 
a Petition with the Court of Appeals 0100 
contain a full, true, and correct record of the above-entitled case 
as the same appears on file in the Office of the Industrial Commission 
of Utah, Department of Enployment Security, the same being all the 
proceedings and all the evidence in the case. 
Secretary 2/ 
Board of Review 
The Industrial Commission of Utah 
Department of Enployment Security 
Date: March 9, 1993 0111 
EMMA R. THOMAS #4681 
Attorney for Respondent 
Board of Review of the Industrial 
Qxnmission of Utah, Department of 
Employment Security 
140 East 300 South 
P. O. Box 11600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84147 
IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL J. M0KTENSEN, : 
Petitioner, : 
ANSWER AND 
v. : 
CERTIFICATION OF RECORD 
DEPARIMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY, : 
Case No. 930093-CA 
Respondent. : 
TO THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS AND THE HONORABLE JUDGES THEREOF: 
Respondent herein has hereby certified that the record of this 
case as contained in Pages 0001 through 0100 of this certification does 
constitute a true and correct record of all documents and transcript of 
testimony and evidence taken in this matter together with the findings 
of fact and decision. 
Respondent answers the Petition of the Petitioner, Michael J. 
Mortensen, and avers: 
1. The decision of the Board of Review of the Industrial 
Commission of Utah is supported by substantial evidence when viewed in 
light of the whole record, and was not arbitrary, capricious and 
unreasonable. 
0112 
2. The decision of the Board of Review, which reversed a prior 
decision of an Administrative Law Judge, properly held that Petitioner 
left work voluntarily without good cause and that it would not be 
contrary to equity and good conscience to iirpose a disqualification 
pursuant to Section 35-4-5 (a) of the Utah Employment Security Act. 
3. The decision of the Board of Review properly established an 
overpayment in the amount of $931.00, pursuant to Section 35-4-6 (e) of 
the Utah Employment Security Act. 
4. The decision of the Board of Review is entitled to deference 
pursuant to a grant of discretion to the agency and the Board of 
Review expressly made in the statute or implied from the language of 
the statute. 
5. The Board of Review's conclusions are reasonable and rational 
in respect to mixed questions of law and fact. 
Dated this V 7 ^ day of March, 1993. 
Emma R. Thomas 
Attorney for Respondent 
Board of Review of the 
Industrial Commission of Utah, 
Department of Employment Security 
0113 
CERTIFICATE OF MAIU2JG 
SERVED the foregoing Certification of Record by mailing a copy, 
postage prepaid, to the following this y day of March, 1993. 
Michael J. Mortensen 
Petitioner, Pro se 
8001 South 1300 West 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
< ^ ^ 0 - / ^ ^ ^ 
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Judith M Billings 
Picsidniii Judge 
Leonard H. Russon 
\ssouate Piesiding Judge 
Russell W Bench 
Judiie 
Regnal W. Gartt 
Judge 
Pamela T. Greenwood 
Jud»c 
Norman H. Jackson 
Judsie 
Gregory K. Orme 
Judge 
Utaf) Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East. Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Clerks' Office 801-578-3950 
Administration 801-578-3900 
Fax 801-578-3999 
May 4, 1993 
Michael J. Mortensen 
8001 South 1300 West 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
In Re: 
Michael J. Mortensen, 
Petitioner, 
Case No. 930093-CA 
Department of Employment Security, 
Respondent. 
Dear Mr. Mortensen: 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk ot the Court 
Our records indicate that the appellant's brief in this case 
was due April 22, 1993. To date, the brief has not been filed 
and is therefore in default. Your brief and seven copies must be 
received in this Court by May 12, 1993. 
If the brief is not filed by May 12, 1993, the case may be 
dismissed pursuant to R. 3(a), Utah R. App. P. 
Sincerely, 
Sheri Knighton 
Deputy Clerk 
^ 
cc: Jan Graham 
Attn: K. Allan Zabel 
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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
MICHAEL J. MORTENSEN, 
Petitioner/Appellant, 
STIPULATED MOTION FOR 
ENLARGEMENT OF TIME 
TO FILE BRIEF 
vs. 
DEPARTMENT OF EMPLOYMENT SECURITY 
Respondents/Appellees. Case No. 930093-CA 
COMES NOW the Petitioner, Michael J. Mortensen, Pro se, who 
requests pursuant to Rule 22, Utah R. App. P., for an enlargement 
of time to file his Brief in the above-entitled matter for the 
reason that he needs 30 days additional time to prepare and file 
his Brief. 
Appellant has not previously requested or been granted an 
enlargement of time. 
The original time that the Appellant's Brief is due is April 
22, 1993. 
Appellant seeks an enlargement of time to file his Brief until 
May 22, 1993. 
Respondent Department of Employment Security, by and through 
its legal counsel, Emma R. Thomas, does not resist Appellant's 
request and hereby stipulates to Appellant's request as stated 
above. 
DATED this 20th day of April, 1993. - ^_ 
BY: 
EMMA R. THOMAS ^tC.
 4 
Department of Employment Security 
140 East 300 South 
P.O. Box 11600 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Attorney for Respondent 
^±H*2£^ 
MICHAEL 0\^ORTENSEN 
8001 Soutn"1300 West 
West Jordan, Utah 84088 
Petitioner, Pro se 
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Judith M. Billings 
Piesidinii Judge 
Leonard H. Russon 
\ssiKiaie Piesidinii Judge 
Russell W. Bench 
Judge 
Regnal W. Garff 
Judue 
Pamela T. Greenwood 
Judiie 
Norman H. Jackson 
Judge 
Gregory K. Orme 
Judge" 
Utaf) Court of Appeals 
230 South 500 East. Suite 400 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84102 
Clerks' Office 801-578-3950 
Administration 801-578-3900 
Fax 801-578-3999 
March 10, 1993 
Michael J. Mortensen 
8001 South 1300 West 
West Jordan, UT 84088 
In Re: 
Michael J. Mortensen, 
Petitioner, 
v . 
Department of Employment Security, 
Respondent. 
Dear Mr. Mortensen: 
Case No. 930093-CA 
Mary T. Noonan 
Clerk ot the Court 
On March 10, 1993, the record index on this appeal was filed 
in this court. The record remains on file with the trial court 
for your use in preparing your brief. The purpose of this letter, 
therefore, is to set the briefing schedule. 
Pursuant to Rules 13 and 26, Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, the appellant's brief must be served and filed on or 
before April 22, 1993. This due date takes into consideration the 
three days mailing provision of Rule 22(d). Briefs filed by use 
of first class mail must be postmarked on or before April 22nd, 
pursuant to Rule 21(a). 
Please refer to the attached checklist and Rules 24, 26 and 27 
for content and format requirements. These requirements are 
strictly enforced. Before making duplicate copies of your 
original brief, you may bring your original to the clerk's office 
at the Court of Appeals for examination. This will ensure that 
the brief is correct, and may save you time and expense. 
Sincerely, 
Janice Hill 
/ Deputy Clerk 
cc: Jan Graham, State Attorney General 
K. Allan Zabel, Special Assistant Attorney General 
0118 
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35-4-5 Ineligibility for Benefits. tylMW 
J 
An individual is ineligible for benefits or for purposes of establishing a ^ 
waiting period: (ft 
Quit. 
(a) For the week in which the claimant left work voluntarily without 
good cause, if so found by the commission, and for each week thereafter 
until the claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment 
and earned wages for those services equal to at least six times the claimant's 
weekly benefit amount. A claimant shall not_be denied eligibility for benefits fjJ^^l 
if Jhe £laimant leaves work undercircumsjances of juch^a nature that jt^  s 
wou]B„ be ^contrary to eauitv^ and good conscience to i^Ppse_a_dis- <= ^flJfalLu 
qualification. ' - \ ft 
Jhe commission shajljn cooperation with the„empiQyjBi> Qonsidexior 
the purposes^fjhis chapter the reasonableness of the claimant's actions, 
and the extent to which the actions evidence a genuine continuing 
attachment to the labor market in reaching a determination of whether the 
ineligibility of a claimant is contrary to equity and good conscience. 
Quit to Accompany Spouse. 
Notwithstanding any other provision of this section, a claimant who has 
left work voluntarily to accompany, follow or join his or her spouse to or in a 
new locality does so without good cause for purposes of this subsection. 
Discharge for Just Cause. 
(b) (1) For the week in which the claimant was discharged for just 
cause or for an act or omission in connection with employment, not 
constituting a crime, which is deliberate, willful, or wanton and adverse to 
the employer's rightful interest, if so found by the commission, and 
thereafter until the claimant has earned an amount equal to at least six times 
the claimant's weekly benefit amount in bona fide covered employment. 
Discharge for Dishonesty. 
(b) (2) For the week in which he was discharged for dishonesty 
constituting a crime or any felony or class A misdemeanor in connection 
with his work as shown by the facts, together with his admission, or as 
shown by his conviction in a court of competent jurisdiction of that crime 
and for the 51 next following weeks and for each week thereafter until the 
claimant has performed services in bona fide covered employment and 
to*-
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SCERT1FICATWR0MINENTLY*« 
STATE OF UTAH 
DEPARTMENT OF COMMERCE 
DIVISION OF OCCUPATIONAL & PROFESSIONAL LICENSING 
LICENSE 
License Number 
0007636026 
•SSUED TO 
Issue Date 
1 0 / 2 8 / 9 2 
Expiration Date 
1 2 / 3 1 / 9 3 
Mortensen, Michael J, 
8001 South 1300 West 
West Jordan 
CLASSIFICATION 
UT 84088-
RECREATIONAL THERAPIST 
CATEGORY SPECIALIST 
SEALED AND ATTESTED 
' ^ PLEASE SEE INSTRUC 
«-rur AIOM. rntSE PERFORATIONS J 
Ste&iXftfRE OF LICENSE HOLDER 
JSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSSS 
% STATE OF 
DEPARTMENT 0 
License No 
0007636026 
ISSUED T O M o r t e n s e n 
8001 Soutl 
West Jordan 
CLASSIFICATION 
RECREATIONAL, 
SPECIALIST 
FOR IDENTHrlCATIO 
0120 
PELLAINTERMOUNTAIN 
Windows • Sliding Glass Doors • Wood Folding Doors 
8020 SOUTH 1300 WEST • P 0 BOX 548 • WEST JORDAN, UTAH 84084 • (801)566-4131 • FAX (801) 566-5414 
March 1, 199C 
To Whom It May Concern, 
Mike is a loyal, hardworking employee who respects authority and 
works well with others- He is a considerate and dependable 
person. 
We enjoyed having Mike as a member of our team at Pella 
Intermountain. 
If you have any questions please feel free to call me at 566-4131 
durina bus iness hours. 
R o bert Fi c klin 
Assistant Ge ne r a1 M a n ager 
Telia Inter m o u n t a i n 
655 FIVE MILE ROAD 
BOISE, IDAHO 83704 
(208)375-8918 
FAX (208) 375-8918 
BRANCH OFFICES: 
#44 UNIVERSITY PARKWAY 
1774 BRIGHAM'S LANDING CENTER 
PR0V0. UTAH 84604 
(801)374-2211 
FAX (801) 374-2248 
251 N0RTHW00D WAY 
P.O. BOX 2213 
KETCHUM, IDAHO 83340 
(208) 726-0966 
FAX (208) 726-1656 
0121 
TAH 
1839 SOUTH 900 WEST - SALT LAKE CITY. UTAH 84104 - TEL (801) 972-3575 FAX (801) 972-3577 
July 6, 1992 
To whom it may concern:-
It is our opportunity to write a letter of recommendation 
for Mike Mortensen. Mike has served our company for the last 18 
months, of which we have enjoyed his personal service. 
Mike is a likable man, gives of his knowledge, time and 
resources freely. He has been a capable office manager, screening 
calls, composing letters, using the computer, handling customers 
on the phone and at the counter. Mike, even at times, has helped 
out in our shop when called upon. Mike is a giving person. 
We wish him well. Please feel free to call us for further 
information. 
Sincerely, 
UTAH PUMP & MOTOR SUPPLY 
KM/sc 
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R562-5a-2. Good Cause. 
1. Good cause is established if continuance of the 
enployment would have had an adverse effect on the claimant 
which could not be controlled or prevented and necessitated 
immediate severance of the enployment relationship, or if the 
work was illegal, or unsuitable new work. 
a. Adverse Effect on the Claimant 
The separation must have been motivated by circumstances 
which made continuance of the employment a hardship or matter 
of real concern sufficiently adverse to a reasonable person 
to outweigh the benefits of remaining employed. There must 
be a showing of actual or potential physical, mental, 
ecoromic, personal or professional harm caused or aggravated 
by continuance in the enployment. The claimant's reason(s) 
for belief of the consequences of remaining on the job must 
be real, not imaginary; substantial, not trifling. These 
circumstances must be applied as to the average individual, 
not the supersensitive. 
b. Ability to Control or Prevent 
Even though there is evidence of an adverse effect on 
the claimant, good cause is not established if the claimant: 
(1) reasonably could have continued working while 
looking for other enployment, or 
(2) had reasonable alternatives that would have made it 
possible for him to preserve his job through approved leave, 
transfer, or adjustment to personal circumstances, etc. or, 
(3) had not given the etployer notice of the circum-
stances causing the hardship so the employer would have an 
opportunity to make adjustments which would alleviate the 
need to quit. An employee which grievances about his 
enployment must show an effort to work out the problems with 
the employer unless such efforts would be futile. 
c. Illegal 
Good cause is established if the individual was required 
to violate State or Federal law or his legal rights were 
violated; provided the employer was aware of the violation 
and refused to comply with the law. 
R562-5a-5. Evidence and Burden of Proof. 
Since the claimant is the moving party in a voluntary 
separation, he is the best source of information with regard 
to the reasons for the quit. The claimant has the burden of 
proof and must show that he had "good cause" for quitting, or 
that he meets the requirements for allowance under the equity 
and good conscience provision before benefits can be allowed. 
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